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Case No. 20091023-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Spencer Russell Strode, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted murder, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004 and 2010 Supp) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (West 2004 and 2010 Supp.). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance in not moving to dismiss based 
on the alleged failure of police to preserve a text message sent by the victim to a 
friend requesting help in beating up Defendant? 
Standard of Review. '"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.'" State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 
339 If 7,143 P.3d 290 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,1f 6, 89 P.3d 162). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the 
issues in this case: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By Information dated October 15, 2008, Spencer Russell Strode was charged 
with attempted murder. R. 1-2. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound 
over for trial. R. 61. 
After a three-day trial, August 26-28, 2009, jurors convicted Defendant of 
attempted murder. R. 172; see also R. 224, 225, 226. 
On November 10,2009, Defendant was sentenced to one to 15 years in prison. 
R. 175. 
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Defendant timely appealed. R. 180. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The debt 
In October 2009, Defendant borrowed $250 from Spencer Rich. R. 226:531. 
Rich claimed that Defendant promised to repay the money "within the next day or 
the day after/' Id. Defendant testified that he had agreed to repay the money 
"within a few days/7 R. 226:555. 
On October 11,2009, Rich asked Defendant to repay the loan. Id.} R. 226:531. 
Defendant met Rich and the two drove to the home of a friend from whom 
Defendant attempted to borrow money to repay Rich. R. 226:534-35. When the 
friend refused, Defendant and Rich drove to the home where Rich was staying and 
parked in the driveway. R. 226: 536. 
According to Rich, Defendant offered a Blackberry cell phone and then a .380 
pistol as collateral for the $250. R. 226:536-37. Rich refused because Defendant had 
said the gun was stolen and Rich is "not a big weapon person/7 R. 226:538. 
At some point, an acquaintance of Rich's named Anthony Mitchell emerged 
from the home and came toward the truck. R. 226:539. Then, according to Rich, 
Defendant produced a .45 caliber handgun and shot Rich four times — once in the 
arm and three times in the stomach. Id. 
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'That's what you get," Defendant said. Id. 
Rich struggled out of the car and called 911. R. 226:540. He underwent three 
surgeries for the stomach wounds and had to use a colostomy bag for 3 Vi months. 
R. 226:541. 
Defendant's version 
Defendant told a different story. "I saw somebody come out of the house and 
around the vehicle, come towards the front of my truck, that's when Spencer Rich 
pulled out a gun, cocked it and said, Well, you're done, and that's when I reached 
for my weapon on the dash, grabbed it with my left hand and fired, cocked it and 
fired." R. 226:559. 
Defendant claimed he fired two shots. R. 226:560. But the victim had four 
bullet wounds — three to the stomach and one to the elbow. R. 224:300. 
Defendant maintained that he was scared and acted in self-defense. 
Q Is it safe to say that Mr. Rich was pulling the gun to 
threaten you and you pulled your gun in defense of yourself? 
A Yes. It would. 
R. 226:575. 
Defendant said he felt bad about the shooting. "I've never intended to shoot 
anybody at all, never happened, never —felt bad about it. " R. 226:561. 
4 
The text message 
Jurors also heard from a third eye-witness: Anthony Mitchell, the man 
Defendant observed walking toward his truck before he shot Rich. Mitchell did not 
testify personally, but jurors were allowed to watch a video of an interview with 
Mitchell conducted by Detective Manny Escoto of the Naples Police Department. R. 
225:429-40; see also State's Exhibit 60A (DVD of Mitchell interview). Mitchell told 
Escoto that he was walking out to the truck because he had received a text message 
from Rich asking for help in "kick[ing Defendant's] ass." R. 225:435. 
Q [by Detective Escoto] All right. So, (inaudible) what else — 
what else — was he — he's not upset, did he say I'm going to kick his ass, 
I'm going to — 
A [by Mitchell] Yeah. Actually like, you know, hey, 
(inaudible) are you here, you know, (inaudible) I'm going to kick this 
guy's ass. 
Q Okay. So, he was kind of asking you to back him up on 
the ass-kicking? 
A Yeah. 
Id. 
However, Mitchell told Escoto that Rich said nothing about having or 
intending to use a weapon in the "ass kicking." 
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Q Did he [Rich] mention about a gun, he having a gun or 
(inaudible) have a gun or was going to have a gun to protect himself 
or— 
A No. 
Q He never mentioned it at all? 
A No. 
R. 225:435. 
Mitchell said that as he approached the passenger side of the vehicle he saw 
"a couple flashes and then bang, bang, bang.. . I ducked real quick, I mean, I didn't 
know what the hell was going on." R. 225:430-31. He said he ran back to his house, 
jumped inside and closed the door. "I didn't know who —you know, what was 
going on. I — I know there was some gun shots — " R. 225:431. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not met his burden to show that his trial attorney was 
ineffective for not moving to dismiss when the State allegedly failed to preserve a 
text message from the victim allegedly asking for help to "beat up" Defendant. 
There is no evidentiary support for the claim that the actual content of the text 
message was exculpatory or, in any event, that it was any more exculpatory than the 
information from police reports and interviews describing its contents, which were 
turned over to the defense and introduced at trial. But even assuming arguendo 
that there was some strategic advantage in obtaining a verbatim copy of the text 
message, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the actual content of the text 
message is not part of the record. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM FAILS 
BECAUSE HE HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO 
DEMONSTRATE DEFICIENT PERFORMMANCE OR 
PREJUDICE. 
Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective because he "fail[ed] to make 
a motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence 
critical to the defense claim of self-defense/7 Aplt. Br. at 7 (capital letters 
lowercased). The "critical exculpatory evidence" was a text message the victim 
apparently sent to Anthony Mitchell in which he asked Mitchell to "assist him in 
beating Spencer Strode up." See Affidavit and Order for Search Warrant ("Search 
Aff."), R. 27. 
These claims fail because Defendant has not met his burden to overcome the 
strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and that 
Defendant suffered no prejudice from the alleged deficient performance. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that trial 
counsel7s performance was deficient— that is, counsel's performance did not meet 
an objective standard of reasonableness —by identifying counsel's specific acts or 
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omissions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Defendant must 
also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different/7 Id. 
at 694; see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19,12 P.3d 92. Defendant must 
show that absent counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable result. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (quotations 
and citations omitted). Such a showing must be based on a "demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter." Id. 
At trial, Defendant never denied shooting Rich, but claimed he did so in self-
defense.1 Defendant claimed that he shot Rich because Rich pulled a gun and was 
1
 Under Utah law, a person is justified in using deadly force "only if the 
person reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to the person or a third person as a result of another person's imminent use of 
unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-402(l)(b) (West 2004 & 2010 Supp.) In determining the imminence or 
reasonableness of deadly force, the jury may consider: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in 
death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' 
relationship. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5). 
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about to shoot him. R. 226:559. Defendant claims that in an effort to pressure him to 
repay a $250 loan, Rich sent a text message to an acquaintance, Anthony Mitchell, 
asking him to "assist in beating [Defendant] up/7 Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant shot 
Rich as Mitchell was approaching the parked vehicle. R. 225:430-31; R. 226:559. 
Defendant claims that his due process rights under the Utah Constitution 
were violated by the State's failure to procure and preserve the text message. Aplt. 
Br. at 9 (citing State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007); see also 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. "Had the text message from the 
alleged victim to the alleged 'eye-witness' requesting help 'beating up7 the 
defendant, the presence of two threatening individuals, and a perceived intent from 
the victim of causing physical harm to the defendant, Defense Counsel would have 
been armed with potent evidence of Self-Defense as a defense to attempted 
murder/' Id. at 12. 
In Tiedmann, the Utah Supreme Court held that once a defendant establishes a 
reasonable probability that lost or excluded evidence would have been exculpatory, 
Utah's due process clause requires a balancing of 
(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and 
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(2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality 
and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a 
whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, Tf 44. In some circumstances, the State's conduct may be "so 
reprehensible as to warrant sanction" even when the prejudice to the defendant is 
minor. Id. at f 45. On the other hand, extreme prejudice to a defendant may require 
a sanction even where there is no wrongdoing by the State. Id. 
Defendant's due process claim fails because he cannot show that introduction 
of the actual text message was necessary or that it could have made any difference 
to the outcome of his trial.2 Although the actual text message apparently was not 
taken into evidence and, therefore, not turned over to the defense, evidence 
concerning its content was made available to the defense and introduced at trial. See 
R. 23,40; R. 225:429-40. Detective Manny Escoto of the Naples Police Department 
testified that he interviewed Mitchell shortly after the incident and that Mitchell 
2
 This point focuses on the prejudice component of the Tiedmann analysis 
because the clear lack of prejudice offers the most straightforward resolution of the 
due process claim. In doing so, the State does concede that Defendant meets the 
other Tiedmann factors. Because the precise language of the text message is 
unknown, it is not clear on this record whether it was exculpatory. But even 
assuming arguendo that the message was exculpatory, Defendant still has not 
shown any negligence or culpability on the part of the State. See Tiedmann, 2007 UT 
49, f 44. 
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acknowledged receiving a text message from Rich asking for help in "kick[ing 
Defendant's] ass/7 R. 225:435. 
Q [by Escoto] All right. So, (inaudible) what else —what 
else—was he —he's not upset, did he say I'm going to kick his ass, I'm 
going t o -
A [by Mitchell] Yeah. Actually like, you know, hey, 
(inaudible) are you here, you know, (inaudible) I'm going to kick this 
guy's ass. 
Q Okay. So, he was kind of asking you to back him up on 
the ass-kicking? 
A Yeah. 
Id. The video recording of this interview was played for the jury during trial. R. 
225:429-40; see also State's Exhibit 60A. Thus, jurors were aware that Rich may have 
been attempting to intimidate Defendant and that he had sent a text message 
soliciting Mitchell's help in doing so. 
Because Defendant has not shown that the actual text message was more 
relevant or exculpatory than the evidence provided to the jury, he has not shown 
that his trial attorney performed deficiently in not challenging the State's failure to 
produce it. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. His ineffective assistance claim fails for 
this reason alone. 
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But even assuming Defendant could show deficient performance by his 
attorney, he still cannot show prejudice because he has not shown a reasonable 
probability of a more favorable result if the actual text message had been introduced 
into evidence at the trial. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Jurors knew from the video of 
the police interview that Mitchell received a text message in which Rich allegedly 
asked him to "back him up", by physically assaulting Defendant in an attempt to 
collect the $250. Yet, jurors still were not convinced that Defendant was justified in 
shooting Rich four times. Absent some showing that the actual text message would 
have made a difference at trial, Defendant cannot show prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
BRETT J. D E L ^ R T O 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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